During the negotiations Wavell suggested the formation of an interim government composed of 5 members from the Congress, 5 from the League and 2 from the minorities other than the Muslims. The Congress opposed parity between it and the League and demanded its right to nominate a Muslim member and that such a government should be responsible to the elected members of the Central Assembly and should be treated as a dominion cabinet with the Viceroy as the constitutional head. The Congress leaders insisted on the immediate formation of an interim government dominated by the Congress. Gandhi demanded a "homogeneous National Government" and was opposed to the formation of "a coalition Government between two incompatibles". On 13 June he wrote to Cripps: "You will have to choose between the two -- the Muslim League and the Congress, both your creations." On the same day he sent a similar message to Wavell.(101)
Wavell believed that the Congress leaders strongly insisted on the immediate formation of an interim government, for "their object was to get power at the centre.... They could at any time torpedo the constitution-making body by raising some crucial communal issue if they so desired. If they could delay constitution-making until they had got British troops out of the country and had control of the police and the army, they would then be in a position to deal with the Muslims and the Sikhs in their own way and in their own time."(102)
After negotiations for weeks, which produced no agreement, the Viceroy in consultation with members of the Cabinet Mission issued on 16 June a statement that he proposed to form a coalition government composed of 14 persons, whose names he announced. Six of them, including one member of the scheduled castes, were from the Congress, five from the Muslim League and three others were a Sikh, a Parsi and an Indian Christian. There was no Muslim in the list other than Leaguers. The statement pointed out: "The above composition of the Interim Government is in no way to be taken as a precedent for the solution of any other communal question."
The statement also announced that if the two major parties or either of them refused to join the coalition government as proposed, the Viceroy would proceed with the formation of the interim government "which will be as representative as possible of those willing to accept the Statement of 16 May", that is, the long-term Cabinet Mission plan.(103)
Penderel Moon writes :
"If it had not been for [Gandhi's] last minute intervention, the Congress would have accepted the Mission's proposal for an Interim Government, and with a Congress-League Coalition Government installed in office at the beginning of July, the communal outbreaks of the next few months would never have occurred."(104)
On 25 June the Congress Working Committee rejected the interim government proposals of 16 June. But it accepted with its own interpretation the long-term proposals of 16 May against the advice of Gandhi. He admitted defeat and withdrew from the Working Committee meeting.(105)
The Muslim League accepted the interim government proposals and, as the 16 June statement enjoined, should have been invited by the Viceroy to form the government. But it was not. The British government relied mainly on the Congress to defuse the revolutionary situation which was increasingly being difficult for them, when even the army was not reliable. They were afraid that in the event of the League forming the government "the Left Wing element in Congress" would regard such a situation "as the signal for starting disturbances". They feared that "it was possible that the Left Wing would get control of Congress" after the AICC meeting in the late summer. Nehru gave them a similar warning.(106)
So, though Jinnah accused the British of bad faith, the question of the formation of the interim government was shelved for the time being.
The situation in India was growing more and more alarming for the British raj. The waves of struggle continued to rise despite communal tension.
At the end of July the India and Burma Committee of the British cabinet concluded that if "some positive action" was not taken "without delay", "the initiative might pass from His Majesty's Government. The postal strike and the threatened railway strike were symptoms of a serious situation which might rapidly deteriorate."
Wavell agreed and wired to Pethick-Lawrence on 31 July :
"League resolution will certainly increase communal tension in the towns which is already bad. Widespread labour trouble exists also and general situation is most unsatisfactory. The most urgent need is for a Central Government with popular support. If Congress will take responsibility they will realize that firm control of unruly elements is necessary and they may put down the Communists and try to curb their own left wing."
Wavell added that he disliked "intensely the idea of having an interim Government dominated by one party but I feel that I must try to get the Congress in as soon as possible".(107)
On 29 July, at the call of the CPI, there had been a very successful general strike in Calcutta and neighbouring areas in sympathy with the all-India postal strike. Revolts were taking place elsewhere too. From U.P., Governor Wylie reported: "This strike business, for instance, is most unsettling.... With all this strike fever about, it would be too much to expect that the police would remain totally unaffected..."
On 9 August the Director of the Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, warned:
"the labour situation is becoming increasingly dangerous....I am satisfied that a responsible government, if one can be achieved, will deal more decisively with Labour than is at present possible."(108)
The Congress leaders too were no less worried and anxious to play their part. In August, the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution condemning the growing lack of discipline and disregard of obligations on the part of workers.(109)
On 5 August Wavell reported to Pethick-Lawrence that, according to an unimpeachable source,
"Patel...was convinced that the Congress must enter the Government to prevent chaos spreading in the country as the result of labour unrest."
Next day Wavell again wired to the Secretary of State:
"I think it is quite likely that Congress [if it joins the Government at the Centre] would decide to take steps fairly soon against the communists as otherwise the labour situation will get even worse."(110)
So Nehru, then Congress President, was invited to form an interim government in the expectation that the Congress leaders would serve as imperialism's shield and protect it from the wrath of the people. The British cabinet, meeting on 1 August, decided that "if the Muslim League were unwilling to come in [on Congress terms], it would be necessary to proceed with the formation of an Interim Government with Congress only".(111)
So a Congress government was installed in office on 2 September with Nehru as vice-president.
The expectations of the raj were more than fulfilled. On 9 October 1946 Nehru informed Lord Wavell that "A short while ago the [U.P. Congress] Government issued an ordinance of the kind we have been issuing here to tide over the period from 1st October..." The U.P. ordinance "provided for the maintenance of public order and essential services through preventive detention, imposition of collective fines, and the control of meetings and processions".(112)
On 21 January 1947 Wavell informed Pethick-Lawrence that searches, still then incomplete, had been conducted, that "the Madras [Congress] Government appear to have taken action against communists and are contemplating a conspiracy case against leading members of the party.... The Bombay [Congress] Government have also written strongly for Central action or a Central directive against the party and indicating that they propose, in the absence of either of these, themselves to take strong action for detention of Communist agitators who constitute a great threat to public tranquillity in that Province."
In this holy war against democratic struggles of the people, the Congress leaders would brook no interference even from British Parliament. Wavell's message added that Home Member Patel deprecated the idea of any discussion in British Parliament of the action taken against Communists "as it can only impede the efforts of Congress to deal with the revolutionary element in the country".(113)
The country-wide search of the offices of the CPI, the Kisan Sabha, the Students Federation, the Friends of the Soviet Union, etc., was carried out "under the direction of the Government of India", of which Patel was Home Member. But in reply to Palme Dutt's cable Nehru unhesitatingly wired back: "The police raids on the Communists took place without the authority or knowledge of the Ministers." A similar reply he sent to Harry Pollitt.(114)
Such were the ways of the Congress leaders.
Even Wavell was amused. Communicating to Pethick-Lawrence on 29 January 1947 that "the Congress Government in Bombay had decided that the only way to deal with the Communists was to resort to detention without trial", Wavell had a dig at the Labour Party minister: "it may come as a shock to you if they should resort to such `imperialistic' methods."
On 27 February 1947 the Bombay Governor reported to Wavell that Bombay's Congress ministry
"are determined to handle the communist and other extreme Left Wing elements firmly, and are bringing forward this session a new Public Safety Measures Bill which re-enacts all our Ordinances in full".
The Bombay Governor also wrote on 2 April 1947 to Viceroy Mountbatten that the Congress ministers of Bombay felt that "their real opponents are the Congress Socialists and the Communists"(115) -- not the British imperialists.
At its twenty-second session held in Calcutta from 13 to 19 February 1947, the All-India Trade Union Congress expressed its concern at the "indiscriminate firing by the police on workers" and stated in a resolution :
"Firing was resorted to in Coimbatore, Golden Rock, Kolar Gold Fields, Ratlam, Amalner and Kanpur [which all belonged to Congress-ruled provinces], resulting in the death of more than 50 persons including women and children and injury to more than 400."
After referring to "the suppression of civil liberties", ban on labour meetings, arrests and internment of trade union workers, destruction of union properties and so on, the resolution added:
"In Madras alone, hundreds of labour workers are in jail, and in some places, Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code has been applied demanding security of good behaviour from labour leaders."
The AITUC also protested against
"the recent amendments to the Bombay District Police Act and the enactment of ordinance in the provinces of Punjab, Madras, Bengal, United Provinces and the Central Provinces under which persons can be arrested, externed or detained without trial".
It also condemned the governments of Madras, Bombay and the Central Provinces for detaining trade unionists in jail without trial and for externing some of them.(116)
It was an all-out war against the restive people that the Congress leaders launched before and after their assumption of office at the Centre. Besides repression, there were other means the Congress leaders employed to put down all struggles including industrial strikes. As noted before, whenever the people rose up against the raj, for instance in February 1946, the Congress leaders condemned them unequivocally and helped the raj actively to suppress them. Nehru even condemned the "pulling down of the Union Jack" during the revolt of the naval ratings.(117) Industrial strikes were anathema to them. As usual, Gandhi went on decrying them. He was afraid that "A great many things seem to be slipping out of the hands of the Congress". If the Congress did not take the necessary steps, "the battle which we are on the point of winning will be lost". He asked all strikers to accept arbitration or adjudication and abide by the advice of the Congress. Both he and Nehru condemned the all-India strike by extremely low-paid postal workers and employees as "against the interests of the common people".(118)
Another means they adopted was to break up the solidarity of the workers, which withstood even the impact of communal holocausts, which their politics inevitably led to. On 12 August 1946 the Congress Working Committee adopted a resolution drafted by Nehru to organize the Hindustan Mazdoor Sevak Sangh on an all-India basis.(119) The Sangh had been functioning at Ahmedabad on Gandhian lines, that is, as a stooge organization of Ahmedabad's textile magnates. When militant working class struggles threatened the interests of the British imperialists and the Indian big bourgeoisie, the Congress leaders took upon themselves the mission of splitting the working class.
They had not exhausted all their weapons against the Communist Party and the people, for they were afraid that the communists, though weak, might take advantage of the situation.(120)
At its meeting in Calcutta on 7 December 1945 the Congress Working Committee took disciplinary action against the communist members of the AICC and asked all subordinate committees to purge the Congress of all communists. As part of their fierce onslaught against the people, the Congress leaders launched a vicious political campaign against the communists in order to isolate them from the people. When they themselves were fully colluding with the raj to put down all struggles of the people, they accused the communists of having co-operated with the government during the war after Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. As B.B. Misra writes, the Congress leaders divested the communist pro-war policy of its ideological content and used "the old `people's war' slogan as an instrument of anti-communist propaganda to gain a political lead at a period when their interests and the interests of the British were becoming noticeably identifiable".(121) Gandhi pledged co-operation with British war efforts in 1944 and 1945. If the communists had acted treacherously, no less treacherous were the acts of Rajagopalachari, but Rajagopalachari became once again a member of the Congress Working Committee in 1946 and succeeded Mountbatten as the Governor-General of India in 1948. And Shyamaprasad Mukherji, president of the All India Hindu Mahasabha, had become a favourite of theirs at least since 1945 and was elected a member of the Constituent Assembly in 1946 as a nominee of the Congress, though the Hindu Mahasabha offered all support to the British from the beginning of the war. Rather, it had always been openly on the side of British imperialism. Perhaps that strengthened the claim of Shyamaprasad. At the conference in London on 4 December 1946, Nehru said:
"There was a great urge among the masses of India for political progress. The Congress leaders had tried, with some success, to restrain that urge and keep it behind the Government."(122)
Instead of allowing the Congress "to monopolize power under the protection of the British regime", Wavell wanted a coalition. Ultimately Jinnah yielded to Wavell's persuasions and, to prevent the Congress from consolidating its power at the Centre, League nominees joined the Interim Government on 26 October 1946 without getting anything they had demanded. They got neither parity with the Congress nor the monopoly of Muslim representation. One of the five nominees of the League was Jogendranath Mandal, a scheduled caste member. Jinnah himself did not join the government. From the beginning there was conflict with the Congress, first over the issue of portfolios. The Congress refused to part with any of the three portfolios -- Home, Defence and External Affairs. Then Nehru wanted to lead the flock of fourteen members of the government, claiming virtually to act as prime minister -- a role disputed by the League. The fight was most bitter over the question of the League's acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's 16 May Statement, which the League had withdrawn on 29 July. The Congress was keen that the League should join the Constituent Assembly where the Congress was dominant. The elections to the Assembly were over by the end of July. The Congress won all the general seats except nine while the Muslim League all Muslim seats except five. At first the Sikhs did not participate in the election, but later they did. The Assembly met for the first time in December 1946. The League refused to accept the 16 May Statement and argued that if the Congress could join the interim government without accepting it unconditionally, it too had every right to remain in the government.
Then there was the conflict over certain provisions of the budget which Liaquat Ali Khan as Finance member prepared in February 1947. While abolishing salt tax and providing some concessions, the draft budget proposed to impose a special income tax of 25 per cent on business profits exceeding Rs 100,000 per annum. This enraged Nehru, Patel and their colleagues; this would hurt the interests of the big bourgeois patrons of the Congress. Naturally, there were violent clashes at the meetings of the Council.
The bitter `war of succession' infected the body politic of India with the communal virus, and communal riots spread to different parts of India. Calcutta was followed by Noakhali, Bihar, U.P. and Bombay.
When thousands of ordinary people were being killed, homes were being plundered, and hundreds of thousands fled their homes the leaders showed no desire to come to a reasonable agreement. Rather, their words and deeds inflamed communal passions.
Gandhi, who had been pushed to the background by Nehru and Patel, went on an ostensible peace mission to Noakhali. At his prayer meetings in the riot-torn villages of Noakhali, Gandhi was repeatedly asked: "can there be any hope of establishing Hindu-Muslim unity here in spite of the Congress-League differences which are at the root of all the troubles everywhere?" Evading such straight questions as "when things are all going wrong at the Centre, what can common people do to restore unity?", he blamed the ordinary people, who were being used as pawns in the power game, for the communal troubles. He was faced with the same question at his prayer-meeting at Sodepur near Calcutta in May 1947: "When everything at the top goes wrong, can the goodness of the people at the bottom assert itself against its mischievous influence?"(123)
When the conflict between the Congress and the League leaders became increasingly sharp, the raj invited to London their representatives and a Sikh representative for a conference in early December. Nehru who represented the Congress refused to accept grouping as an essential feature of the long-term plan of the Cabinet Mission. Jinnah was prepared to accept the plan provided the Congress accepted compulsory grouping.
After the failure of the talks, the British Government issued a statement on 6 December, in which it stated that compulsory grouping and arriving at decisions of the sections by a majority vote were "an essential part of the scheme of May 16". It appealed to the Congress "to accept the view of the Cabinet Mission in order that the way may be opened for the Muslim League to reconsider their attitude". It said in conclusion :
"Should a constitution come to be framed by a Constituent Assembly in which a large section of the Indian population had not been represented, His Majesty's Government could not of course contemplate...forcing such a constitution upon any unwilling parts of the country."(124)
On 13 December 1946, Jinnah said that "the Muslim League's condition for entering the Constituent Assembly was the unequivocal acceptance by the Congress of the British Government's interpretation of the grouping clauses".
But the Congress leaders refused to accept the interpretation of the British Government on the plea that compulsory grouping was in conflict with the basic principle of provincial autonomy and that it "affected injuriously two provinces especially, namely, Assam and the North-West Frontier Province, as well as the Sikhs in the Punjab".(125)
Gandhi advised the Assam Congressmen and the Sikhs not to go into the Sections and to rebel against the Congress, if necessary.(126)
Congress resolutions and statements and Gandhi's advice were intended to bury the Cabinet Mission plan, the last hope of averting partition of India on religious lines.
A memo by the secretary to the Cabinet Mission found it "difficult to see what advantage they (Congress) expect to get from insisting on this interpretation [which rejected grouping], because the interests of Assam and the North-West Frontier are really safeguarded by the provision that they can opt out later".
The Secretary to the Cabinet Mission and several others completely misunderstood the Congress leaders' object. The interests of Assam and the NWFP were of the least concern to the Congress leaders nor were those of the Sikhs. Soon after as we shall see, they had no hesitation to throw the Congressmen of the NWFP to the wolves, as Abdul Ghaffar Khan accused them of doing: by opposing later the provincial option to stay out of both Hindustan and Pakistan, they deprived the NWFP of the right to be an independent Pathanistan and forced it to be a part of Pakistan. And, as we have seen and shall see more of it, the Congress leaders were the sworn enemies of the principle of provincial autonomy though they might use this card to destroy the Cabinet Mission Plan.