We have seen that it was the policy of the Congress leaders, as the Nehru Committee report of 1928 said categorically, to protect the interests of the princes, the puppets of British imperialism, and to serve as a bulwark against democratic revolution in the feudal princely states. On the eve of the transfer of power, when there was the danger of a big mass upheaval in the states and when in some states like Kashmir, Hyderabad and Travancore, the people raised the banner of revolt, the Congress leaders were anxious to promote friendly co-operation between the autocratic state administrations and the states people's organizations.
In April 1946 Nehru, then president of the All India States People's Conference, wrote:
"The desire of the States People's Conference to proceed in a manner friendly to the Princes, as far as possible, is evidenced by a statement that in States absorbed to a larger unit(152) suitable provisions should be made for the present rulers and their personal dignity and position safeguarded."
He assured the rulers that they, "whether big or small, can not only be sharers in that heritage [of the greatness and progress of India as a great power] but can play a notable part in the India that is going to take shape. Their position can in reality be greater and more honourable if they have the capacity and the will for it than their present position."
Speaking at the general council of the AISPC in June 1946, Nehru affirmed:
"our approach to the Princes must be a friendly one....Our objective is responsible government in the States under the aegis of the ruler as a constitutional head."(153)
It is usually held that Nehru's dash for Kashmir in the midst of negotiations with the Cabinet Mission in May was impelled by his passionate desire to fight the repression let loose by the Kashmir state government and to stand by Sheikh Abdullah (vice-president of the AISPC) and other National Conference leaders and workers who were thrown into jail. What really perturbed Nehru was the demand of the Kashmir National Conference that the Maharaja must `Quit Kashmir'. It had sent a memorandum to the Cabinet Mission, which raised the question of the Amritsar treaty and demanded "that this treaty be abrogated and Kashmir be ruled by the people of the State".(154) By the Amritsar treaty of March 1846, the British sold Kashmir and Hazara along with the people to Gulab Singh, a sardar of the Lahore Darbar, on payment of several lakhs of rupees. In 1946 the National Conference launched a mass campaign under the slogan `Quit Kashmir'. At the call of Nehru, Sheikh Abdullah left for Delhi and the movement was suspended. On the way Abdullah was arrested and a reign of terror was unleashed. The whole of the Kashmir valley was brought under military administration. Many were shot and killed, and more were put behind bars. All sorts of humiliation were inflicted on the people. While criticizing the state's repressive measures, Nehru in a press statement affirmed that it was "the policy of the All India States People's Conference to demand full responsible government in all the States under the aegis of the ruler" and regretted "that the issue of the ruler continuing or not was raised in Kashmir at this stage". Before he left for Kashmir, he tried to assure the Maharaja that the purpose of his visit was to bring about a peaceful settlement and appealed to him to release Abdullah. The Kashmir authorities banned his entry into the Kashmir territory. He entered it but returned to Delhi at the instruction of the Working Committee. Gandhi, Patel and Azad appealed to the Maharaja to lift the ban on Nehru and it was removed. After assuring the Maharaja and others about his peaceful intentions, Nehru went to Kashmir with the consent of the Viceroy and Gandhi. The net result of his visit was that Abdullah signed a statement in court, jointly drafted by Nehru and Asaf Ali, retracting the earlier demand for the abolition of the monarchy. Abdullah was not released; atrocities on the people continued; the civil disobedience movement was withdrawn; and it was decided to participate in the proposed elections when "almost every one of their workers was in prison".(155) So a happy settlement was achieved through Nehru's efforts.
After the 3 June 1947 plan was accepted, the interim government set up a States Department with Patel in charge and V.P. Menon as secretary to negotiate relations with the native states. With the transfer of power British paramountcy over the states would cease and all treaties and agreements between the British and the states would lapse. It was decided by the Congress leaders that the princes would be invited to accede to the Indian Union under three subjects only -- Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. On assuming charge of the department Patel said:
"The States have already accepted the basic principle that for Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications they would come into the Indian Union. We ask no more of them than accession on these three subjects, in which the common interests of the country are involved. In other matters we would scrupulously respect their autonomous existence.... I should like to make it clear that it is not the desire of Congress to interfere in any manner whatever with the domestic affairs of the States."(156)
Earlier, on behalf of the State Committee of the Constituent Assembly, Nehru negotiated an agreement with the States Negotiating Committee of the Chamber of Princes that "not less that 50 per cent of the total representatives of States [in the constituent assembly] shall be elected by the elected members of legislatures [which were hardly representative of the people] or, where such legislatures do not exist, by other electoral colleges" and upto 50 per cent of the representation would be nominees of the princes. The agreement was arrived at without any consultation with the organizations of the states people. When at the AISPC conference in the third week of April, Nehru sponsored a resolution for endorsing the agreement, Ghulam Mohammad Khan of Kashmir moved an amendment, suggesting that the people of the states should be asked to send their representatives directly to the constituent assembly. The amendment was withdrawn at Nehru's intervention. Other amendments seeking to scrap the fifty-fifty agreement were either ruled out of order or defeated.(157)
The princes were treated quite generously after the states' integration into the Indian Union. As Nehru said at the San Francisco Press Club in 1949, "a large majority of them had been given generous privy purses and...some of them had been absorbed in the public service [as ministers, ambassadors, governors, etc.]",(158) besides continuing to enjoy several other benefits.
After interminable negotiations for about one year and a half, which ended with the acceptance of the Mountbatten Plan on 3 June, it took less than two months and a half to partition India -- to demarcate the boundaries of the new states, to divide the administrative machinery of the central government and those of Punjab and Bengal, as well as the assets and liabilities, the defence forces, and so on! A little earlier, "Auchinleck had expressed the view that it would take from 5 to 10 years satisfactorily to divide the Indian Army." Mountbatten had pointed out to Nehru "that it took two years to separate Burma (now Myanmar)" from India in the mid-thirties,(159) though there were natural boundaries between these two countries. It was not so in Punjab and Bengal (and the Bengali-speaking Sylhet district in Assam), where Hindus and Muslims (and Sikhs), belonging to the same nationalities lived intermingled in "thickly populated and long-settled areas, each of which formed an integrated economy and system of communication".
Mountabatten told Nehru that he "was less interested that India should be handed over on lines which might ultimately prove correct than that mechanism should be set up to avoid bloodshed after the departure of the British". As we shall see, he was least interested in either of the two: rather, knowingly and with the full consent of the Congress and League leaders he did what made the communal carnage many times more terrible than what was likely.
There was no plebiscite in Bengal and Punjab, giving the people the option, among other options, to choose whether they wanted to have their provinces undivided and outside Hindustan and Pakistan. On 17 May Jinnah wired to Mountbatten in London demanding plebiscite in Bengal and Punjab and reiterated the same demand on Mountbatten's return from London on 30 May. Earlier, on 4 May, Bengal governor Burrows had intimated to Mountbatten that "A plebiscite however could be held if delay involved is not a bar".(160) It was possible to hold a plebiscite, at least in Bengal, before June 1948 -- the date by which the British government had decided to withdraw. Not only were the views of the people not ascertained but even the members of the legislatures of Bengal and Punjab, as noted before, were not allowed the option to vote in favour of preserving the integrity of their provinces outside Hindustan and Pakistan, under the pressure exerted by the Congress leaders.
With incredible callousness and irresponsibility the date was advanced flippantly on 3 June by Mountbatten to 15 August -- by more than ten months -- leaving less than two months and a half for implementing the partition plan, which included the holding of referendums in the NWFP and Sylhet. This abrupt decision of Mountbatten, which was welcomed by the Congress and League leaders, played havoc with the lives of millions. It may be noted that on 13 May, 1947, when the date by which the British proposed to withdraw was June 1948, Mountbatten held
"that the time factor precludes me from fully implementing the partition plan. For instance, the material for deciding the issues concerned with the assets and liabilities between the Centre and the Provinces and the Provinces inter se, may not be easily available. It is also possible that the Boundary Commission may not be ready with their recommendations."(161)
What might not be possible by June 1948 was sought to be achieved by 15 August 1947!
The cynical indifference to the lives of tens of millions was shared by the Nehrus and Jinnahs. They too were in a hurry. To attain powers of administration within the quickest possible time and out of fear of the submerged masses the Nehrus were not bothered by their old, incessant rhetoric that the constituent assembly should be elected on the basis of adult suffrage when such an assembly was proposed by the Cabinet Mission. Nehru spoke of convening another constituent assembly after the transfer of power(162) -- another piece of conscious deception. In about mid-June 1947 Nehru urged Mountbatten that the work of the Boundary Commissions, yet to be formed, should be rushed through and the "fairly lengthy process involving the ascertainment of the wishes of the people concerned in any particular area affected" should be postponed to a date later than their installation in power, as if the Congress and League leaders would be reasonable and willing to adjust the boundaries after they were fixed or to settle any other differences in the interest of the people. This was another ploy to divide Bengal and Punjab as quickly as possible regardless of the people's interests.
It was decided to set up two Boundary Commissions, one to divide Bengal as well as the Sylhet district of Assam and the other to divide Punjab. Each Boundary Commission was to consist of a Chairman and four members, two nominated by the Congress and two by the League. On the recommendation of the Secretary of State, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a British lawyer, was appointed on 27 June the chairman of both the Boundary Commissions. In actual practice it was a one-man commission which was given the task of dividing Punjab, Bengal and Sylhet. All decisions were his alone. The Indian Independence Act passed by British Parliament which conferred `independence' on India, pointed out that the expression `award' used in the Act, in relation to the Boundary Commissions, meant "the decisions of the chairman of that commission..."
Radcliffe arrived in India on 8 July. He met the Indian leaders -- Nehru, Patel, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. Radcliffe pointed out to them that the job entrusted to him "would take even the most careful arbitrators years to decide" and asked if the "importance of having an award by August 15th, taking into account its inevitable imperfections outweighed all other considerations. Each said that it did". The "inevitable imperfections", which would be a source of permanent sorrow and suffering to millions, were of no concern to the leaders -- Congress or League. Among many glaring "imperfections", one was the award by Radcliffe of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, a non-Muslim area, to East Pakistan whose inhabitants, tribal Chakmas, hounded out of their homes, have been forced to live as refugees in hostile surroundings elsewhere.
Radcliffe undertook the work not before 12 July. He, as Mosley said, never saw the land he was dividing and "was not even given the right map to do it with".(163) Besides the appalling heat of summer in north India, he had to contend with the differing opinions of the other members of the commissions, masses of evidence, arguments, memoranda and petitions. This colossal work he accomplished in about a month -- a super-human feat. But the Indian leaders had promised to abide by his decisions, however harmful they might be to the common people.
On 11 July the Punjab governor Jenkins sent a note saying that the Punjab Boundary Commission had
"given the Punjab Government an enormous questionnaire the replies to which cannot at the earliest be ready before about 20th July. Thereafter, if the information collected is to be studied and transferred to special maps and if the parties are to be heard at any length (they have engaged very eminent counsel), it is difficult to see how the Commission can report by 15th August."
The farce of this demarcation of boundaries can be appreciated if one remembers that Radcliffe was to report not only for Punjab but also for Bengal and Sylhet.
On 16 July Jenkins made a special request for
"as much advance intimation not only of the date of the award but also of its contents as can be given. Whatever the date and whatever government will be in power when the award is announced, it will be necessary to take precautions, especially in those districts which are likely to be affected, particularly those in the central Punjab."(164)
The situation in Punjab was an extremely grim one. As early as 16 August 1945 the then Punjab Governor Glancy had reported to Wavell that "the consensus of opinion is that, if Pakistan becomes an imminent reality, we shall be heading straight for bloodshed on a wide scale".
Warnings from Punjab came thick and fast. For instance, Governor Jenkins reported on 2 May 1946 that private armies of the different communities were being organized; on 9 May he told Wavell that "the Punjab was in inflammable state"; and noted on 31 August that "We have the material for a vast communal upheaval". In July 1947 he frantically tried to impress upon New Delhi the importance of an early award so that the administrative machinery might have time to use its resources to minimize bloodshed. On 20 July, when he met Mountbatten, he told Mountbatten that
"Even a few hours warning would be better than none, as the nature of the Award would affect the distribution of the police and troops."(165)
On 22 July Mountbatten wrote to Radcliffe that the members of the Punjab Partition Committee had
"emphasized that the risk of disorder would be greatly increased if the award had to be announced at the very last moment before the 15th August.... We should all be grateful for every extra day earlier that you could manage to get the award announced. I wonder if there is any chance of getting it out by the 10th?"
Next day, replying to Mountbatten, Radcliffe assured him that "he could promise the 12th but he would do the earlier date if he possibly could".
It appears from the letter of 8 August from Abell, the private secretary to the Viceroy, to Abbott, private secretary to the Punjab governor, enclosing "a map showing roughly the boundary which Sir Cyril Radcliffe proposes to demarcate in his award" and a note describing it, that Mountbatten had secured advance information regarding Punjab by 8 August. And on the same day Abell wrote in a note that Radcliffe had, "in fact, already dictated his award".(166)
It appears that the Punjab award was ready on 9 August.
Now Mountbatten staged a volte face. He, like the others, knew that each day's delay in announcing the award increased the risk of violent disorders leading to massacres. He was reminded also by men on the spot of the explosive situation. On 11 August Maj.-Gen. D.C. Hawthorn stated:
"The refugee problem mainly from Eastern Punjab to Western Punjab is becoming increasingly difficult and more and more of the population is on the move..."
On 13 August Jenkins reported to Mountbatten :
"The Hindus are thoroughly terrified and the Muslim movement from the East is balanced by a similar movement of Hindus from the West...."
On the same day General Messervy and General Rees sent a telephone message to Mountbatten's office, which stated that in East Punjab gangs were operating and men getting killed and that the Amritsar countryside was "bereft of police". Seventy per cent of policemen in Amritsar were Muslims and they had been ordered to hand in arms. The telephone message added: "Postponement of Boundary Commission's Award causing uncertainty." And on 15 August, in a note on the Punjab Border Force area, C-in-C Auchinleck referred to his visit to Lahore on the previous day and observed:
"The delay in announcing the award of the Boundary Commission is having a most disturbing and harmful effect."(167)
Yet Mountbatten sat on the Boundary Commission Awards and resorted to dishonest tricks and lying to withhold announcement of them until the transfer of power was over -- until 17 August -- which was responsible for terrible carnage in Punjab.
At the all-White staff meeting (from which V.P.Menon was excluded) on 9 August, it was stated that by that evening Radcliffe would be ready to announce the Punjab award. Mountbatten did not think it "desirable to publish it straight away" for "the earlier it was published, the more the British would have to bear the responsibility for the disturbances which would undoubtedly result". (But from 15 August the responsibility would be transferred to the Indians.) The Viceroy insisted that not only the terms of the award but also the fact that the award would be ready that day should be kept a secret.
Hodson writes that Mountbatten had a private meeting with Radcliffe about 9 August and "asked whether Sir Cyril could hold his reports until after 15 August". An entry in W.H.J. Christie's diary for 9 August states:
"Staff Meeting today concerned with Boundary Commission timing of announcement and precautions -- George [G.Abell] tells me H.E. [the Viceroy] is in a tired flap, and is having to be strenuously dissuaded from asking Radcliffe to alter his award."
According to Campbell-Johnson, Mountbatten said at the meeting that "if he could exercise some discretion in the matter he would much prefer to postpone its appearance until after the Independence Day celebrations..." In his personal report, dated 16 August, to the king and important ministers, Mountbatten was not being truthful when he wrote that he knew on 12 August that the Radcliffe "awards would be ready by noon the following day, just too late for me to see before leaving for Karachi". He himself admitted in the same report as well as in his letter to Listowel, dated 14 August, that the Bengal award had been sent in on 12 August.(168)
There is hardly any doubt that the Punjab award had been ready on 9 August and Mountbatten knew of its contents. But he made arrangements with Radcliffe so that both the Punjab and Bengal awards were dated 12 August.
Though Mountbatten knew quite well the consequences of the delay in announcing the awards, especially, the Punjab award, he put off announcing them until 17 August, for, as he wrote in his personal report dated 16 August, "the later we postponed publication, the less would be the inevitable odium react upon the British". In his address to the Indian Constituent Assembly on 15 August Mountbatten boasted that he had set up a machinery on 3 June which carried out "one of the greatest administrative operations in history -- the partition of a sub-continent of 400 million inhabitants and the transfer of power to two independent governments in less than two and a half months".(169) For this mad rush in partitioning India and installing two governments in the two new states, the Congress leaders were ecstatic in praise of Mountbatten.
But what was the price that the Indian people paid for this achievement? It took a toll of countless lives in Punjab alone. In Punjab, as Penderel Moon writes,
"Between August 1947 and March 1948 about four and a half million Hindus and Sikhs migrated from West Pakistan to India and about six million Muslims moved in the reverse direction."(170)
The massacre was so widespread and the misery of the refugees was so agonising because there was no central authority after 14 August. And the administrations in the partitioned provinces were then at the initial stage of building up. "In East Punjab", writes Menon, "the administration...had virtually broken down." The Boundary Force that was set up on 1 August under Major General Rees for putting down disorders in Punjab, as Moon writes, suffered from "total inadequacy...in point of numbers. The force also consisted of mechanized infantry units which would hardly be able to operate in the rural areas during the monsoon."
Since 1947, Bengal has seen waves of migration from time to time. In 1971 alone, about ten million people came over from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to West Bengal but most of them returned after the defeat of the Pakistani forces. The wretchedness of the whole affair is indescribable. There have been massacres at places in the two Bengals at different times, though not on the Punjab scale.
The achievements of Mountbatten and the Indian leaders have till now inflicted on the people three wars and the prospect of more to come. That "partition of India would be a most serious potential source of war" was a view held by Mountbatten himself.(171)
The Indian leaders added fuel to the fire directly, not merely by their policies. In a long memorandum attached to his letter of 4 August to Mountbatten, Jenkins wrote that the critics who deplored the communal riots in Punjab -- Congress, League and Sikh leaders -- "themselves are in part responsible for this situation and have given no help to the authorities".(172) While the work of separation proceeded fast, nothing was done to set up joint machineries to deal with common problems like defence, communications and the like. Cripps, who was interested in such arrangement, sent W.H. Morris-Jones to India. During the negotiations with the Cabinet Mission, Jinnah had proposed confederal arrangements. But when Morris-Jones came to Delhi, Mountbatten was hardly interested and Nehru even less. Some sort of confederal arrangement, which might avert many tragedies, was farthest from Nehru's mind.(173)