

place, but no formal host government request for assistance until the level of intensity of insurgent activity reaches Phase II or Phase III.

In a Phase II insurgency situation, US assistance efforts would of necessity, probably, be of a higher level. The United States could provide equipment; training; and, under some circumstances, unit advisors and support for indigenous forces. The US response would probably be limited to specially trained Security Assistance Forces, combat support, and combat service support elements. A commitment of this size would probably exceed a MAAG's capability and require the commander of the unified command to establish a command and control headquarters in the host country. If two or more military services are involved, this would be a joint headquarters. Security Assistance Forces are discussed in chapter 6.

In a Phase III insurgency situation, expanded US assistance may include selected and specially tailored US combat forces. In this situation, the host government will be expected to provide the maximum possible manpower for its combat forces. US forces and indigenous forces should operate under the direction of a combined headquarters and an overall combined plan. This will be facilitated if US support elements and unit advisors are present at the time US combat forces are introduced. Normally, US combat forces will be under the operational command of a US commander of a joint task force or a subordinate unified command.

At whatever level of insurgency US support is first provided, support must be sufficient to immediately seize and maintain the initiative. This affords a psychological edge and avoids the pitfall of a slow escalation which the insurgents will be encouraged to match.

DURATION OF US PARTICIPATION

The host country government and US representatives will continue to assess the threat and to negotiate the level of US assistance. Whatever the level, plans from the very beginning should limit US participation and prepare for eventual withdrawal. US withdrawal should be phased in conjunction with an increase in host country capabilities, possibly added support from other nations, or a decrease in the threat.

US assistance may be initiated at any level of intensity from Phase I through Phase III. It is not intended that a gradual escalation of US commitment from a training effort to employing combat forces will necessarily take place. A realistic assessment should consider long term and short term assistance activities and the probable duration of US participation. FID operations of either low intensity conflict Type A or Type B - - or both - - may be introduced. Possibly, US combat forces may precede other elements into the host country.

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

Military operations against insurgent forces can be only a part of the fight to prevent defeat of the host government. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS (discussed in chapter 2) provide a fertile breeding ground for insurgency; they are a part of the threat and must be addressed by any government that seriously attempts to prevent or defeat an insurgency. US FID operations must become part of an overall effort of internal defense and internal development.