

CHAPTER 6

exists or directly for the MAAG. As such, US Army advisory personnel require an appreciation of the security assistance responsibilities and functions of each of the other services represented in the MAAG. They should be familiar with the full scope of the MAAG operations in order to effectively perform their mission.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH US COUNTRY TEAM (USCT). A US Army advisor may also find himself working and coordinating with civilian members of other USCT agencies. He must know the functions, responsibilities, and capabilities of the other USCT agencies since many activities cross jurisdictional boundaries. The exact relationship between USCT members will depend on the desires of the chief of the diplomatic mission. At times the advisor will have to seek out the other members of the USCT for coordination. Whatever the situation, the chief of the MAAG normally obtains concurrence of the chief of the US diplomatic mission prior to advisory personnel holding discussions with host country military authorities on substantive security assistance issues.

RELATIONSHIP WITH HOST COUNTRY MILITARY.

The primary prerequisite for effectively advising a counterpart is an understanding of his sociological, psychological, and political makeup. Accomplishment of the advisory mission often depends more upon positive personal relationships between US advisors and host country counterparts than upon formal agreements. Advice offered by advisors may be the least desired assistance and only tolerated to obtain matériel and training assistance. Even when accepted, host country military leaders may not immediately act upon advice given by their US advisors. In times of crisis, regardless of how valid and logical the recommendations of US military advisors may be, the military leadership of most developing countries will act within the framework of its own sociopolitical culture and experience. Often, what may appear logical to the advisor may not appear logical or practical for political, cultural, or economic reasons to those he advises. Also, host country military leaders, while outwardly agreeing with the advisor on needed changes, may actually be undermining the accomplishment of reforms and attempting to preserve those traditions and practices from which they derive their power and influence.

US Army advisors may have limited influence in host country internal security matters. This may not be solely the result of the relationships with the host country counterparts because the US Army's role in internal defense in a particular host country may be relatively minor in view of the overall US security assistance effort. Also, there may be some identifiable factors which are attributable to the peculiarities of the host country military. The military activities in developing nations are often determined more by political consideration than by military logic; and political objectives and constraints, rather than military operational capabilities and effectiveness, often dictate the roles, missions, and organizational strength and composition of host country military and other security forces. Another factor is threat perception. Many developing nations perceive the major threat to their national security as being external and, therefore, may tend to underestimate the seriousness of an internal insurgent threat. Consequently, they may organize, train, and equip their military forces primarily to meet an external threat.

The host country's capability to plan for and manage its total defense resources is the advisor's primary concern. The military of developing nations may not develop a capability to fully manage their defense establishments and resources if they continue